Epidemiological Challenge Destroys European "Union"
This is probably not very high on anybody’s agenda at the moment but, given the extra time on my hand, I can't help but notice that the #EU has resorted to measures aimed to contain the #COVID2019 virus that betray a deep mistrust of communal-collective solutions.
Acting under the shock of the scandalous-malign exit of its second largest economy, and the ongoing psychosis of having to deal with an unreliable global strategic partner, the member states have elected national--and, from the perspective of EU politics, clearly nationalist--measures.
Therein lies a major set of clues as to what the EU is-plus some implications for its future. First, the COVID scenario has, clearly, defied the methodological assumptions upon which most scholars have relied, if only implicitly, as they treat the EU exclusively as a single entity. This is the "take" of a vast majority of studies on the EU, focusing on "Brussels," "EU policy," etc.
There has been a bit of a historical problem with this implicit approach, since EU has repeatedly refused what was widely seen as the "logical next step” for its political development-becoming a federal state. Ergo, the approach to the EU as a single state is, let's just say, "somewhat exaggerated," its widely used image as a single entity is, clearly, imprecise as a general model.
One of the reasons for the EU elites' refusal to transform their supra-state political organization to a single federal state is, in my opinion, because conversion to single, unified statehood would deny the EU the opportunity to continue playing its main most successful strategic-geopolitical game, something I have called the elasticity of size.
Under the strategy of the elasticity of size, the EU has created for itself a way to switch between two modes of operation.
In contexts where capital ownership-i.e., how big a chunk of the global total wealth / income each actor has to its disposal-determines collective outcomes, the EU routinely presents itself as a single quasi-state. In accordance with this strategy, the EU maintains embassies world-wide (something that, other than the EU, only states have), and maintains an extremely effective, single process of global influence-making, e.g., in the #WTO, the #IMF and #IBRD.
In fora where decision making is based on single-country voting, however--e.g., in the United Nations General Assembly, as well as the myriad other agencies of the UN--the EU suddenly mutes its "unified” presentation-of-self and its member states vote--after careful coordination and harmonization of course--in unison, with 28 (well, after Brexit, 27) votes. All of the EU's member states also maintain conventional "national" embassies world-wide, hence producing situations where geopolitically important capitals have 28 "EU-embassies" (i.e., 27 for each member state plus one for the EU-as-a-whole). Nice, if your purpose is to exert influence on the rest-of-the-world but look in the meantime as if you were just a loose bunch of friends, hangin'out together.
The idea of transforming the EU into a federal state has therefore been unattractive from the perspective of the political, economic interests of EU-elites--not only because of nationalist sentiments (i.e., as it would, no doubt, reduce member state autonomy). This is of course true, and the widely accepted explanation for the failure of the referenda in favor of federal statehood. There is, however, yet another reason.
A transition to federal statehood is unattractive to EU elites because federal statehood would mean single statehood. Ergo, the second modality—of the elasticity of size game--acting like a herd of single states—-would be impossible under such conditions.
And . . . then . . . along comes the predictable, and predicted, pandemic. This presents those of us who are trying to understand just what the EU is a fantastic opportunity, a real-life experiment. This story helps answer the question, "How does the EU political system react to a real challenge that threatens everyone?"
Well, what we have seen thus far is an EU whose member states have reintroduced reinforced border controls everywhere, and closed the national borders in the most affected states. The anti-coronavirus measures are framed nationally, all over the continent, including those countries that have not yet closed their borders. Even the high priests of European unity--the German and French political elites--are talking exclusively in national terms.
What we don't see is the emergence of a single public health authority, with a single COVID2019 prevention-mitigation strategy. No pan-continental oversight of the success of the measures. No pan-EU coordination of regulations concerning the movement of people or goods. No pan-EU provisions for reasonably equal access to medical and public health technologies, from masks and hygienic wipes to high-tech. Each of the 27 Prime Ministers uses this opportunity to show how prepared, trustworthy, "on top of things," in other words, how great s/he, his/her cabinet, etc. is.
The pandemic has put the EU under an emotional and moral test. And the EU failed that test as a single entity. There is no mention of the "sharing and pooling" of anything any more. We are back to national anxieties, fears, psychoses and "solutions."
The EU is not ready to be what its name says it is. It is European alright (there is nothing more European than national selfishness and pettiness). What it isn't is a Union.
. . . And, based on what I have perceived thus far, the emotional and moral costs of even that national selfishness and pettiness are carried by the societies of this future-less "continent" of low horizons and small imagination unevenly. The brunt goes to the poorer parts.
As always.
As an EU-citizen with an actual memory, I can't resist pointing it out that this very issue--whether the EU should be a relatively comfortable playground for west European capital but no more than an unruly conglomerate of un-coordinated, jingoistic, national states OR its elites should actively and creatively seek to bring about a truly supranational polity--has been the essence of the debate between the extreme Right (led by the Orbáns, Kaczyńskis or Salvinis) and the conventional political forces in the EU. Thus far, the reactions to the epidemiological challenge show that the extreme nationaliist Right is winning--almost without a fight, by default, as a fall-back option.
Acting under the shock of the scandalous-malign exit of its second largest economy, and the ongoing psychosis of having to deal with an unreliable global strategic partner, the member states have elected national--and, from the perspective of EU politics, clearly nationalist--measures.
Therein lies a major set of clues as to what the EU is-plus some implications for its future. First, the COVID scenario has, clearly, defied the methodological assumptions upon which most scholars have relied, if only implicitly, as they treat the EU exclusively as a single entity. This is the "take" of a vast majority of studies on the EU, focusing on "Brussels," "EU policy," etc.
There has been a bit of a historical problem with this implicit approach, since EU has repeatedly refused what was widely seen as the "logical next step” for its political development-becoming a federal state. Ergo, the approach to the EU as a single state is, let's just say, "somewhat exaggerated," its widely used image as a single entity is, clearly, imprecise as a general model.
One of the reasons for the EU elites' refusal to transform their supra-state political organization to a single federal state is, in my opinion, because conversion to single, unified statehood would deny the EU the opportunity to continue playing its main most successful strategic-geopolitical game, something I have called the elasticity of size.
Under the strategy of the elasticity of size, the EU has created for itself a way to switch between two modes of operation.
In contexts where capital ownership-i.e., how big a chunk of the global total wealth / income each actor has to its disposal-determines collective outcomes, the EU routinely presents itself as a single quasi-state. In accordance with this strategy, the EU maintains embassies world-wide (something that, other than the EU, only states have), and maintains an extremely effective, single process of global influence-making, e.g., in the #WTO, the #IMF and #IBRD.
In fora where decision making is based on single-country voting, however--e.g., in the United Nations General Assembly, as well as the myriad other agencies of the UN--the EU suddenly mutes its "unified” presentation-of-self and its member states vote--after careful coordination and harmonization of course--in unison, with 28 (well, after Brexit, 27) votes. All of the EU's member states also maintain conventional "national" embassies world-wide, hence producing situations where geopolitically important capitals have 28 "EU-embassies" (i.e., 27 for each member state plus one for the EU-as-a-whole). Nice, if your purpose is to exert influence on the rest-of-the-world but look in the meantime as if you were just a loose bunch of friends, hangin'out together.
The idea of transforming the EU into a federal state has therefore been unattractive from the perspective of the political, economic interests of EU-elites--not only because of nationalist sentiments (i.e., as it would, no doubt, reduce member state autonomy). This is of course true, and the widely accepted explanation for the failure of the referenda in favor of federal statehood. There is, however, yet another reason.
A transition to federal statehood is unattractive to EU elites because federal statehood would mean single statehood. Ergo, the second modality—of the elasticity of size game--acting like a herd of single states—-would be impossible under such conditions.
And . . . then . . . along comes the predictable, and predicted, pandemic. This presents those of us who are trying to understand just what the EU is a fantastic opportunity, a real-life experiment. This story helps answer the question, "How does the EU political system react to a real challenge that threatens everyone?"
Well, what we have seen thus far is an EU whose member states have reintroduced reinforced border controls everywhere, and closed the national borders in the most affected states. The anti-coronavirus measures are framed nationally, all over the continent, including those countries that have not yet closed their borders. Even the high priests of European unity--the German and French political elites--are talking exclusively in national terms.
What we don't see is the emergence of a single public health authority, with a single COVID2019 prevention-mitigation strategy. No pan-continental oversight of the success of the measures. No pan-EU coordination of regulations concerning the movement of people or goods. No pan-EU provisions for reasonably equal access to medical and public health technologies, from masks and hygienic wipes to high-tech. Each of the 27 Prime Ministers uses this opportunity to show how prepared, trustworthy, "on top of things," in other words, how great s/he, his/her cabinet, etc. is.
The pandemic has put the EU under an emotional and moral test. And the EU failed that test as a single entity. There is no mention of the "sharing and pooling" of anything any more. We are back to national anxieties, fears, psychoses and "solutions."
The EU is not ready to be what its name says it is. It is European alright (there is nothing more European than national selfishness and pettiness). What it isn't is a Union.
. . . And, based on what I have perceived thus far, the emotional and moral costs of even that national selfishness and pettiness are carried by the societies of this future-less "continent" of low horizons and small imagination unevenly. The brunt goes to the poorer parts.
As always.
As an EU-citizen with an actual memory, I can't resist pointing it out that this very issue--whether the EU should be a relatively comfortable playground for west European capital but no more than an unruly conglomerate of un-coordinated, jingoistic, national states OR its elites should actively and creatively seek to bring about a truly supranational polity--has been the essence of the debate between the extreme Right (led by the Orbáns, Kaczyńskis or Salvinis) and the conventional political forces in the EU. Thus far, the reactions to the epidemiological challenge show that the extreme nationaliist Right is winning--almost without a fight, by default, as a fall-back option.
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